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Much literature has focused on the influence of the World Bank with regard 
to policy reform in low-income countries. While this literature has been 
produced over the course of many decades, the underlying studies have not 
tended to take a multi-decade approach to examining the way that World Bank 
influence changes in a given country. Put differently, studies tend to examine 
specific periods of time rather than looking at influence over time. This article 
seeks to contribute to scholarship on World Bank influence by looking at a 
twenty-year period of World Bank engagement in Indonesia. The purpose is 
(a) to map the nature and influence of the World Bank as it engaged with the 
government of Indonesia (GOI) around education and development policy, 
(b) to reflect on how and why that engagement changed over time, and (c) to 
consider the implications of the study in relation to the broader literature on 
the evolution and current status of World Bank influence. The focus of this 
article is in the area of governance, where the World Bank has pushed and 
experimented with decentralization, community-driven development, and 
school-based management. While the article focuses on education policy, 
reforms in this area have been impacted by governance reforms more broadly. 
Keywords: education policy; community-driven development; school-based 
management; governance; World Bank; Indonesia 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Much literature has focused on the influence of the World Bank (WB) with regard to 
policy reform in low-income countries (Edwards & Storen, forthcoming). This literature 
has been produced over the course of many decades but the underlying studies have not 
tended to take a multi-decade approach to examining the way the WB influences changes 
in a given country.1 Instead, studies tend to examine specific periods of time rather than 
influence over time. The present article seeks to contribute to scholarship on WB 
influence by looking at a twenty-year period of WB engagement in Indonesia. In 
reference to this time horizon, the purpose is (a) to map the nature and influence of the 
World Bank as it engaged with the government of Indonesia (GOI) around education and 
                                                 
1 For exceptions, see Bujazan, Hare, La Belle, & Stafford (1987) and Edwards, Victoria and 
Martin (2015).  
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development policy, (b) to reflect on how and why that engagement changed over time, 
and (c) to consider the implications of the study in relation to the broader literature on the 
evolution and current status of WB influence. As will become clear, the focus of the WB’s 
engagement—and thus the focus of this article—has been in the area of governance, 
where it has pushed and experimented with decentralization, community-driven 
development, and school-based management. While the article focuses on education 
policy, reforms in this area have been impacted by governance reforms more broadly, in 
ways that will be discussed. 
As for key terminology, it is important to be clear: decentralization refers to the shift of 
responsibilities from the central government to lower levels of government; community-
driven development, refers to when communities assume varying degrees of autonomy in 
the selection and implementation of development projects; and, school-based 
management refers to the management of various aspects of a school’s duties by 
committees that are made up of parents, teachers, and principals. However, as indicated 
above in discussing the purpose of this article, the central focus is not these reforms 
themselves or their implementation in practice but rather the relationship between the WB 
and GOI over time. 
What makes this case particularly interesting is that, in the 2000s, the GOI took steps to 
alter the dynamics of the relationship between itself and the WB by increasing funding to 
education. However, as will be shown, while GOI funding has increased and while WB 
influence has shifted, it is not necessarily the case that the WB is altogether less 
influential. In the post-2000 period, and in the face of government assertiveness and its 
desire to increase its influence, WB aid management, technical assistance, research 
capability, and knowledge dissemination have become more important, if still relatively 
invisible to the casual observer, with traditional mechanisms related to financing being 
downplayed publicly – although, arguably, this mechanism continues to play a significant 
role, as well. 
The article begins with a brief note on theory and method before describing the context 
of Indonesia. A findings section follows in which four distinct phases of WB engagement 
are addressed. The final section focuses on discussion, connections with the broader 
literature on WB engagement, and conclusions. 
THEORY AND METHOD 
Conceptually, the research was conducted from the perspective of what has been labelled 
“critical international political economy” (Edwards, 2018). In short, this perspective 
balances a focus on material and ideational factors. It does so by tracing interaction 
among actors from the WB and the government while taking into account the ways that 
this interaction is (a) strategically-informed (e.g., by the actors’ own calculations), (b) 
structurally-constrained (e.g., by the political-economic conditions within which the 
government operates), and (c) ideationally-informed (e.g., by the prevailing reform trends 
in the realm of international development). In the present article, the focus is to trace the 
ways that governance-related reforms—both generally and with regard to education—
have evolved within the dynamics specified by critical international political economy. 
Space constraints here prevent a fuller discussion of the foundations of this theoretical 
perspective; see an extended discussion in Edwards (2018). 
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The research on which this article is based was conducted during 2014.2 The research 
began with a desk review of documents pertaining to the WB’s governance-related 
projects during the 1970s to 2014, including such sources as project appraisal documents, 
project completion reports, project amendment documents, etc. (see Edwards, 2014). This 
review was followed by interviews with 25 senior organizational and governmental 
actors, all with extensive experience and in-depth perspectives on the engagement and 
influence of the WB in Indonesia when it comes to developing and implementing aid 
projects. The interviewed actors represented the WB, the US Agency for International 
Development, the Australian Agency for International Development, the Ministry of 
Education and Culture (MOEC), and the National Development Planning Agency. The 
inclusion of interviewees from a range of organizations helped to extend and triangulate 
the claims made by interviewees from the government and the WB. Interviews were 
complemented by a review of academic literature on the evolution of foreign aid and 
education policy in Indonesia. To analyse the data, a variety of methods were purposively 
selected for their ability to unpack the dynamics of interest—that is, the dynamics of 
influence between the WB and GOI over time. These methods included: counter-factual 
analysis (where one reflects, based on an in-depth understanding of a particular case, on 
what would have happened if the WB had not been involved in education reform and had 
not acted as it did); process tracing (where one follows the genesis and evolution of policy 
ideas); and the use of heuristic matrices (i.e., tables) to portray and examine various forms 
of engagement and influence over time and across “levels” (e.g., international, national). 
For more on the methods employed to analyse the data, see Edwards (2012b). 
In this research, theory and method worked together to produce the insights offered here. 
That is, the perspective of critical international political economy directed attention to the 
structural, relational, and ideational aspects of the context in Indonesia while the methods 
discussed above helped to understand and unpack those same aspects. The theory and 
method employed here were ideal for the research since it was exploratory in nature, since 
it sought to characterize and interpret the nature of interaction and the manifestations of 
influence between the WB and GOI over an extended time horizon—and all in relation 
to the governance reforms of decentralization, community-driven development, and 
school-based management. In line with the focus, theory, and methods of the article, the 
findings presented below are organized according to the phases that emerged and the 
issues or themes that defined those phases. 
CONTEXT 
After independence in 1945 and until 1967, the Communist Party of Indonesia, under the 
autocrat Sukarno, ruled Indonesia. Sukarno’s regime was characterized by strict, top-
down pathways of authority, a framework that was further embraced when martial law 
was re-instated in 1959, abandoning the 1950 Constitution aimed at ensuring freedoms 
of individual citizens (Bjork, 2003). After a bloody coup in 1966, Sukarno lost power to 
Suharto. Suharto instated a “New Order”—so named to contrast with Sukarno’s “Old 
Order”—and opened up Indonesia to foreign investment. Another important change was 
Suharto’s move to rejoin the WB and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1967, at 
a time when Indonesia was heavily dependent on foreign aid and assistance (Engel, 2007). 
                                                 
2 The findings presented here have been adapted from the more extensive write-up in Edwards 
and Storen (forthcoming). 
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Sukarno had walked out on both institutions two years prior, partly due to the United 
Nations (UN) endorsement of the creation of Malaysia (Toussaint, 2008). 
In a long-term perspective, between 1968 and 2004, not only did the WB have a strong 
presence in Indonesia, but this institution also offered over US$30 billion in loans to the 
country (Engel, 2007). For much of this time (1974-89), the WB was the main source of 
external funding (Toussaint, 2008). With the introduction of Structural Adjustment Loans 
(SALs) during the time of Robert McNamara’s leadership of the WB (1968–1981), 
Indonesia saw a stronger commitment to export-oriented policies, privatization, and 
deregulation (Engel, 2007). Additionally, during the WB’s heyday, both this organization 
and GOI placed emphasis on the idea of decentralization. 
Universal primary education was also encouraged as part of the poverty-reduction 
strategies of the 1980s, but despite the WB applauding Indonesia’s achievement of 
universal primary education in the early 1980s, the quality of national education remained 
low (Bandur, 2012). Throughout the 1980s, transition rates from primary to secondary 
school continued to drop and were, in 1986, as low as 64.9% (Bandur, 2012). Attempting 
to mend some of the short-comings of the national education system, the Indonesian 
MOEC launched a pilot program on local curriculum integration, called the Local Content 
Curriculum (LCC) in 1987 (Bjork, 2003, 2005). The program granted authority over 
schools to provinces, a trend that increased after the unanimous re-election of Suharto in 
1988. Suharto’s “New Order” had made significant attempts—or at least gestures—to 
transform Sukarno’s top-down authority framework of the 1950s and 60s. Despite the 
rhetoric of decentralization and community-based decision-making, however, the legacy 
of authoritative rule still held strong, and lower levels of government remained closely 
dependent on instruction from the central government (Alatas, Pritchett, & Wetterberg, 
2003). Moreover, a custom of foot-dragging in the transfer of power, resistance to the 
implementation of accountability mechanisms, and corruption (e.g., payments for 
services, kickbacks, patronage networks, and nepotism in contract allocation, etc.; see 
“setbacks and struggles” section in Edwards & Storen, 2017) has complicated efforts to 
implement decentralization policies. 
Nevertheless, as with trends in development more generally, both the WB and the 
Indonesian government would continue to experiment with various forms of 
decentralization and community-based initiatives in the 1990s (Edwards, 2012a; Edwards 
& DeMatthews, 2014). This is not surprising, since the WB had referred to 
decentralization of governmental powers and functions as a “make or break issue” for 
Indonesia in the period leading up to the string of decentralization projects in the 80s and 
90s (Bjork, 2005). The next section characterizes the ways that Indonesia experimented 
with decentralization and community-based initiatives in the 1990s and 2000s while also 
explaining the changing role of the WB during that time. As will be shown, in order to 
understand the trajectory of governance reforms in education, one must first understand 
reforms outside the education sector.  
FINDINGS 
Phase 1: World Bank modifies and improves the government’s community 
governance programs 
During and prior to the 1990s, the GOI ran programs at the community level in both urban 
and rural areas that WB would seize upon and further extend. It is essential that we 
understand the origins of these programs and how they became objects of the WB’s 
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attention. Having this understanding is important because these programs would serve as 
the basis for future programs at the heart of Indonesia’s governance reforms. 
The approach to community governance in urban areas can be traced back to the 
Kampung (slum) Improvement Program (KIP). Though KIP was re-launched in Jakarta 
slums in the early 1990s,3 government-assisted KIP programs were first implemented in 
Indonesian urban slums in 1969,4 with the WB contributing US$483.3 million in funding 
from 1970 to 1988 (World Bank, 1995, p. 12). From its inception, KIP’s goal was to 
“alleviate poverty by supporting efforts to improve housing services and basic 
infrastructure in low-income areas known as kampungs [slums]” (World Bank, 1995, p. 
6). The KIPs focused on infrastructure, particularly paved roads, school construction, 
health clinics, and water supply. 
In WB documents from the early 1990s, the KIP was referred to as a self-help community 
program. In contrast with the KIP program from the 1970s and 1980s, when investments 
were made according to needs identified by the government, in the 1990s, the 
involvement of community-based organizations in the KIP was believed to ensure 
participatory development, less wastage, and fund usage that more closely reflected the 
needs of the communities (Juliman, 2006; World Bank, 1995). Tellingly, the evaluation 
of the KIP model, as implemented in the 1970s and 1980s, concluded the following:  
Despite . . . the limits reached by a centralized model in meeting urban sector needs, 
the government remains the dominant decision maker in urban development to this 
day. Yet difficulties experienced by both the government and the Bank in supervising 
multi-city projects from Jakarta hastened efforts to devolve project implementation 
responsibilities to the local level of administration. (World Bank, 1995, p. 8). 
The report then went on to suggest that, “future projects should promote working 
partnerships with community groups and non-governmental organizations” (p. 9). It is, 
therefore, not surprising that the revised version of KIP in the 1990s gave communities 
the responsibility of recognizing development needs, and then using the KIP grants to 
meet them. For an idea of how the revised version of this community-led development 
model worked, see the description in Box 1 of a sister program (implemented in rural 
areas). An additional point to note is that the revised version of KIP was run through the 
WB’s own KIP unit within the government’s Housing Department, likely a response to 
the frustration that the WB felt with regard to how the government managed the program 
(Juliman, 2006). 
                                                 
3 Available documents do not indicate in which year the KIP program was re-launched. 
4 On the history of KIP in the pre-WWII period, document review revealed: “The Kampung 
Improvement Program (KIP) was first introduced during the colonial government, when 
members of the opposition in the Dutch Parliament demanded more “humane” conditions 
for local populations living in urban areas in the colonies. The establishment of municipal 
governments early in the century brought about a renewed interest in the topic of 
kampung improvement. The first period of KIP extended from the 1920s to the beginning 
of World War II. Surabaya and Semarang started with the improvement of some 
kampungs in 1924, an effort initiated by the municipal government.” (World Bank, 1995, 
p. 17) 
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There are two key developments to highlight from the above. The first is that, in the early 
1990s, while the WB was attracted to the general model of relying on communities to 
carry out development projects (Edwards, 2012a), it was not comfortable with the fact 
that community-level projects were chosen by the government. Since the 1980s, it has 
been common for the WB to criticize government-led development as overly-centralized, 
bureaucratic, inefficient, and lacking in accountability. In Indonesia, the WB also has a 
long history of struggling with “leakage” of loan funds—a term employed to refer to 
misappropriation and corruption. The WB thus saw the KIP program as a response to 
these challenges. Though already mentioned previously, the second development to 
highlight is the fact that the WB saw it as necessary to create its own unit within the 
government in order to manage the revised KIP program in the 1990s. This development 
not only underscores the extent to which the WB wanted to avoid government control of 
the program but also marks the beginning of a trend, for the WB would take similar 
actions with the rural version of KIP. 
With regard to rural governance, in the mid-1990s, the WB took the community-driven 
development model implemented by the government in rural villages (known as the Left-
Behind Village program) and created a parallel program that was managed by the WB 
and funded by its loans (known initially as the Village Infrastructure Project and later as 
the Kecamatan [sub-district] Development Project). From the perspective of the WB, 
GOI’s own “top-down transfer system [for its rural program] was clumsy and slow,” and 
it suffered from problems of elite capture and political manipulation (World Bank, 2001, 
Box 1: Project Identification and Design in Rural Areas through the Kecamantan 
(sub-district) Development Program 
The Kecamantan (sub-district) Development Program (KDP) was an effort to address 
long-term structural poverty in [rural areas in] Indonesia through targeted, 
decentralized block grants. The KDP was financed with a World Bank loan of $225 
million and $47 million from the government of Indonesia. Its goal was to support 
village-level investments. 
How are these village-level investments identified? A participatory village project 
identification and planning process prioritizes one or two projects that are then 
formulated with the help of trained facilitators—often students. Projects can only be 
submitted by community-based organizations (CBOs) that have existed for at least a 
year. If more than one project is identified, then one has to come from a woman’s 
CBO. The project has an “almost open” menu of eligible investments (excluding a few 
options, such as religious buildings and environmentally damaging projects), trusting 
the poor to select investments that will have the greatest influence on poverty 
reduction. 
The projects are technically appraised by local experts (villagers with relevant skills 
or experience), in consultation with line agencies in order to seek possible synergies 
and avoid conflicts with planned agency operations. Proposals that pass these filters 
are then submitted to the Kecamatan council, which discusses and prioritizes them 
according to their overall impact, poverty impact, and technical and financial 
feasibility. Those that are approved are funded. 
Source: Dongier et al., 2002, p. 307 
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p. 4). For these latter reasons, the WB’s rural development program gave block grants 
directly to the villages, in order to avoid the government’s system of transfer across 
multiple bureaucratic levels. This aspect of the WB’s programs represented a significant 
departure from the highly-centralised nature of the Indonesian government that had been 
cultivated under President Suharto and the New Order state (World Bank, 2001); it was 
also a departure that would continue in the late 1990s and 2000s, as explained in the next 
section. 
Phase 2: Crisis, World Bank influence, and scaling up in the education sector 
At the brink of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, the WB was involved in the funding 
and support of several projects in Indonesia, as discussed above. Decentralization and 
block grants funding mechanisms were central. When the economic crisis finally arrived, 
Indonesia was hit hard. Worsened by the El Niño drought and the drastic drop in rice 
production, the time period of 1997–98 exacerbated poverty and hunger. Economic 
growth dropped from a promising +7% in early 1997 to -15% the following year 
(Bresnan, 1999). The year 1998 brought about political crisis, which, after a “leaderless” 
revolution 5  and pressure from the US, eventually resulted in Suharto’s resignation 
(Bresnan, 1999). Although the US had suffered criticism for having supported Suharto’s 
dictatorship through continued economic aid, Suharto’s fall now “offered a new 
beginning for US policy in Indonesia” (Bresnan, 1999, p. 105). 
The US and the IMF offered bailouts to Indonesia, but after controversial bailouts in 
Mexico6 in 1994 the offers made to Indonesia came with a high level of conditionality. 
Conditionalities included closing heavily indebted banks and cutting government 
spending. In addition, under the interim presidency of Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, 
decentralization was pushed in all development reforms. During this time of crisis, the 
interim president may have been more easily influenced by WB’s preferred governance 
models, namely decentralisation in various forms. The WB was in an ideal position to 
push such reforms, since it already had in progress multiple decentralization projects that 
it was funding and assisting. At the same time, decentralization was of interest to the 
central government in order to reduce tensions between itself and the provincial level 
governments, some of whom were interested in seceding from Indonesia.  
The Asian Financial Crisis not only brought about massive reforms in both the political 
and economic sphere, but also placed Indonesia increasingly under the influence of 
lending institutions such as the WB and the Asian Development Bank. An urgent need 
for finances also changed the landscape of development programming. The WB’s rural 
community governance programs (described above) were particularly important during 
the recession because they provided cash payments to those hired through community 
grants. This model was seen to be relevant to the WB’s education sector programs, in the 
context of the crisis. According to a senior education specialist associated with the WB 
for over a decade starting in 1999: 
                                                 
5 Observers have called the revolution leaderless because of the fact that there was not one single political 
party or resistance group leading the way; rather, at the time, the mounting political pressure was the 
culmination of the work of numerous social resistance groups.  
6 The US and IMF bailout in Mexico sparked international criticism. It was believed that the bailout 
undermined any incentive for the recipient country to uphold macro discipline. Despite the US firmly 
stating that the Mexico bailout was a special case, and not a model for future crisis, critics were worried 
that other countries would expect the same International Monetary Fund bailout (Musacchio, 2012). 
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Many of the traditional projects (that tend to give funding to the government to focus, 
e.g., on school construction), which were well under way, were reshaped to release 
something like six hundred million dollars, which could be then targeted to the 
massive scholarships and grants programs, which was basically targeted at providing 
the schools and the kids with enough resources to continue at school and for schools 
to continue to operate at their current levels (INTACT5).7  
Moreover, according to the aforementioned WB education specialist, in addition to “great 
panic that kids would be dropping out of school because they couldn’t afford to stay,” a 
side-effect was that “traditional programs never re-entered the scene after (the crisis)” 
(INTACT5). 
A notable lesson from the above is that the crisis provided the opportunity for the WB to 
adapt its community-driven development model—based on block grants—to the 
education sector, where it had not yet been introduced. This is exactly what happened. 
Starting in the late 1990s, block grant programs became a key characteristic of school 
governance projects—under the label of school-based management—funded by the WB 
and reforms implemented by the GOI.8 It also stands out that the crisis provided an 
opportunity for the WB to extend its influence and its preferred governance models, as is 
often the case (Edwards, 2015; Klein, 2007). 
Phase 3: Government Reaction—Increase Funding 
With the surge in WB funding and involvement in the post-Asian Financial Crisis period, 
it could be challenging to navigate between the regulations stipulated through WB loans 
and those sent out by the MOEC. According to a veteran within the MOEC, one education 
project was cancelled due, in part, to issues with WB requirements. At the time of the 
2003 Education Act, which meant the formal adoption of school-based management for 
the roughly 216,000 public and private schools in the country (Bengoteku & Heyward, 
2007), he remembers asking the WB to make more room for flexibility in their 
conditionalities. Requests such as these produced tension. The aforementioned-MOEC 
veteran characterized the interaction in the following way: “[The WB] sometimes, you 
know, seem like, look down to us . . . Just like, ‘you don’t know anything . . . about the 
program.’ Even at the time we are just arguing . . . and arguing. ‘This is the Bank money, 
you should follow our regulation.’  Yes, I know, that’s the Bank money. But you know, 
this is a loan . . . I paid to the bank, you know” (NATACT3). 
As the 2000s progressed, the financial position of the WB became less dominant, due to 
the 2002 amendment of the Constitution, which required all levels of government to 
allocate 20% of their budget to education (though this requirement would not be met until 
2009; Suharti, 2013). Following this move, a specialist with over 15 years of experience 
in the WB and the Australian Agency for International Development noted this in 2003: 
“that’s when we were getting the first indications that the government was maybe going 
to move away from borrowing for social sectors . . . They were much more aware of the 
necessity to borrow less and apply their own funds for education” (INTACT5). The 
increase in GOI funding—and its desire to depend less on the WB—thus came about as 
                                                 
7 Interviewee names have been replaced with pseudonyms, such as, INTACT5, in this case. 
8 See Edwards and Storen (2017) for more on the details of school-based management in 
Indonesia and the ways that it built on existing GOI programs related to scholarships for 
disadvantaged students and school construction programs. 
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a reaction to the heightened influence that the WB enjoyed in the years following the 
Asian Financial Crisis. 
Phase 4: The Changing Role of the World Bank? The Importance of Non-Financial 
Influence.  
In the mid-2000s, within and outside the realm of education, GOI sought to increase its 
independence. Outside education, in the area of governance generally, GOI made plans—
or at least expressed an intention—to combine and then for itself to manage the urban and 
rural community-driven development programs discussed earlier in Phase 1. These 
programs were brought together under the label of the National Program for Community 
Empowerment (PNPM, for its acronym in Indonesian). The establishment of PNPM as 
the lead community-driven development program was also meant to indicate a shift 
toward increased government leadership and governmental implementation of such 
initiatives (World Bank, 2012b). As explained in a WB project document, it would work 
with the government and other development partners to design PNPM during 2007–2009 
while simultaneously continuing to scale up existing urban and rural community-driven 
development programs before working together to “consolidate PNPM management” 
during 2010–2013, after which point it was anticipated that GOI and its development 
partners would use PNPM as a platform to launch other “anti-poverty” programs (World 
Bank, 2007a; World Bank 2012b). 
In accordance with GOI’s vision of being more independent, it provided significant 
funding for PNPM. One report from 2012 mentions that, since 2008, GOI provided 
US$316 million for PNPM Urban (compared with US$442 million from the WB and 
US$242 from the Islamic Development Bank) and US$2.5 billion for PNPM Rural 
(compared with US$2.3 billion in loans from the WB) (World Bank, 2012a, p. 19–23). 
In all, then, during these four years alone, GOI contributed at least US$2.816 billion, 
about equivalent to the WB-provided funding of at least US$2.742 billion during the same 
period, with the implication being that the GOI was, at least financially, on a similar level 
as this institution during this time. 
However, in the years after 2006, when plans for PNPM began, there was a clear 
divergence between intention and reality when it came to leadership more generally. 
Although various governmental ministries remained, formally, the implementing 
agencies for the rural and urban community-led development programs, the WB remained 
integral to program direction in numerous ways. That is, since the birth of the PNPM idea, 
the WB has been central to the planning, design and implementation of PNPM and the 
programs that make it up (World Bank, 2007a, p. 4). For example, WB teams from the 
urban and rural governance projects worked together to prepare operational manuals, 
project reporting documents, supervision teams, and results monitoring frameworks 
(World Bank, 2007a). WB loans regularly included funding so that the WB could assist 
with technical issues, could augment the capacity of the implementing agencies, and 
could hire and manage teams of consultants. 
More generally, the WB oversees the PNPM Support Facility (PSF), which was set up in 
~2010 and which is charged with providing effective leadership and management for 
PNPM programs. Multiple donors use the PSF as a channel to provide funds for specific 
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programs within PNPM.9 As the Asian Development Bank describes the PSF “as a multi-
donor mechanism” that, “enables donors to provide targeted financial assistance to the 
government to support [the PNPM program] target areas, as well as high-quality, 
coordinated technical assistance, planning advice and dialogue” (ADB, 2012, p. 21). 
From the WB’s perspective, the PSF is useful for “improving the quality of PNPM as 
well as . . . build[ing] Indonesian capacity for large-scale poverty reduction, with the aim 
of making the program a sustainable operation” (World Bank, 2012b, p. 4). Finally, the 
facility is used as a means by which development partners can experiment with innovative 
pilot projects, such as conditional cash transfers. Overall, then, rather than taking over 
PNPM or consolidating its leadership under the GOI, the design and implementation of 
PNPM has created additional and broader ways for the WB to institutionalize its own 
influence and to shape the evolution of Indonesia’s community-driven development 
initiatives. 
In the realm of education, the same phenomenon occurred. Starting in the mid-2000s, and 
in contrast with the 1990s, GOI provided half or more of the funding for new projects 
developed with the WB, including projects related to school-based management, which 
continued to make use of the block grant mechanism for providing funds to the local level 
(Edwards, 2014). However, when it came to technical assistance, there is clear evidence 
that the MOEC has continued to rely on the WB. This is most clear from the experience 
of an ironically-named “Basic Education Capacity Project.” Begun in 2007, the project 
was entirely financed by GOI but focused on funding policy-dialogue, research studies, 
the piloting of innovative programs, the modification of existing program manuals, and 
building district-level decentralization capacity (see Edwards & Storen, 2017, for more 
detail). Thus, despite increased funding from GOI, the WB’s engagement remained 
central and very influential within and beyond the education sector in Indonesia. As is 
discussed further in the next section, the WB’s knowledge products and non-financial 
support have long been key pathways for the influence of this institution. 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
The focus of this article has not been on the implementation of either community-driven 
development or school-based management. Rather, engagement between GOI and the 
WB around these reforms has provided a window through which to analyse the influence 
of the latter vis-à-vis the former. To that end, the central point of this short article is that, 
in spite of increased levels of funding from the GOI in the 2000s for its governance 
reforms within and outside the realm of education, the WB remained a very influential 
actor. That is, while the WB’s influence changed, it still remained very impactful, albeit 
in a different way. As explained, the WB’s non-financial forms of engagement—which 
had for decades been a key aspect of their portfolio of services—took on a leading role in 
development support in Indonesia once the government decided that it wanted to reduce 
its dependence on WB loans. 
Although the GOI has continued to rely on the WB in various, non-financial ways, we 
should be careful not to underappreciate the fact of GOI’s increased financial 
                                                 
9  Major contributors to PSF are the Government of Australia, US Agency for International 
Development, the UK Department for International Development, the Danish International 
Development Agency, and the Canadian International Development Agency, the Netherlands, 
and the European Union, in addition to the WB (ADB, 2012). 
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commitments. Indeed, many countries do not have the capacity to decide that they will 
reduce their dependence on the WB by providing at least 50%t of the funds needed for 
new development projects. Indonesia was able to do this because of the size of its 
economy—ranked 16th in the world in 2016 by the IMF (2017)—together with moves to 
cancel the GOI’s domestic fuel subsidies (which freed up US$10 billion), the steady 
growth of the economy, and declining debt service payments (with these latter two items 
producing an additional US$5 billion in revenues) (World Bank, 2007b). The case of 
Indonesia is thus instructive in that it reveals what happens even when a country is in a 
relatively advantaged economic position. 
Thinking broadly, we should not be surprised by the WB’s non-financial influence. Not 
only have scholars long noted the influence of “rational” international organizations 
(Berman, 1992)—thanks to the widely-held perception that they are credible and valuable 
sources of expertise (Barnett & Finnemore, 2005)—but scholars have also detailed the 
forms that such influence can take (Samoff, 2009). Samoff (2009), for example, explains 
how, outside of financial infusions, the WB can also exert influence through the following 
pathways: technical assistance (i.e., advice and recommendations), research, general 
publications, certification (wherein the WB, e.g., provides accolades to a program or 
projects or otherwise indicates that a reform is viewed positively), management of the aid 
relationship (by taking care of various administrative functions related to its loans), 
coordination of foreign aid (e.g., overseeing the provision and use of other agencies’ 
funds), and international events, among others. Indeed, each of these pathways of 
influence were relevant to the experience of Indonesia, many of which are described in 
the section above on phase four (for more detailed description, see Edwards & Storen, 
2017). 
Highlighting the presence of the above-mentioned forms of influence in the case of 
Indonesia raises a more vexing question. That is, while financial influence is a fairly 
unambiguous form of influence, and is one that is easy to identify in practice, what is to 
be done about the intellectual and strategic forms of influence from which the WB 
benefits. It is true that, in the case of Indonesia, the GOI was concerned exclusively with 
financial influence. And while we have an answer to what happens when, at least in 
reference to the current case, a government decides that it wants to reduce reliance on 
financial infusions from the WB, we are now left to reflect on the form of influence that 
emerges in its place (or, rather, that is further revealed by the diminished role of financial 
influence). Put differently, the question becomes: How can interested governments 
reduce or eliminate their dependence on the WB (or, indeed, similar organizations) when 
it comes to knowledge dissemination, research and evaluation, policy dialogue, and aid 
coordination? 
The above question is more salient than ever, as the WB itself, since the late 1990s, has 
emphasized its ability to provide “knowledge for development” (Samoff & Stromquist, 
2001) and has continued to move in the direction of underscoring its competitive 
advantage around policy knowledge and reform expertise (Klees & Edwards, 2014; 
Mundy & Verger, 2015). Moreover, and just as importantly, it is not simply a matter of 
the WB projecting its capacity as a knowledge broker; rather, research has shown that the 
WB’s technical and strategic abilities continue to be useful for and continue to be 
perceived positively (even enviously) by peer organizations (Edwards, Okitsu, da Costa, 
& Kitamura, forthcoming), bilateral aid agencies (Verger, Edwards, & Kosar-
Altinyelken, 2014), and national governments (Edwards & Loucel, 2016; Shajahan, 
2016). Thus, while there are no easy answers, both recent scholarship and the present case 
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of Indonesia speak to the need to further consider how interested governments can escape 
not only the specific policy advice provided by the WB but also the broader development 
paradigm represented by this institution. Put differently, what needs to be addressed is 
not only the effects of WB projects and policies, which often tend to exacerbate inequity 
(based as they are in market mechanisms) but also the inequitable distribution of power 
and influence that tends to characterize the relationship between the WB and borrowing 
governments.10 
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